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In this paper I investigate the understanding of eros expressed in the speeches
of Phaedrus and Agathon in Plato’s Symposium, two speeches often neglected
in the literature. I argue that they contain crucial insights about the nature of
eros that reappear in Diotima’s speech. Finally, I consider the relation of Socra-
tes and Alcibiades in light of these insights, arguing that the figure of Alcibia-
des should be seen as a negative illustration of the notion of erotic education
described by Diotima. 
„Was tun Sie“, wurde Herr K. gefragt, „wenn Sie einen Menschen lieben?“
„Ich mache einen Entwurf von ihm“, sagte Herr K., „und sorge, daß er ihm ähnlich wird.“
„Wer? Der Entwurf?“
„Nein“, sagte Herr K., „der Mensch.“
Bertolt Brecht
Introduction
Was Socrates a bad, or even sterile, lover?
Did Plato want us to see this? Was this per-
haps his indirect criticism of his great teach-
er? Such is the accusation brought forward
against Socrates by a number of prominent
interpreters of the Symposium.1 The heart-
felt speech delivered by the drunken Alcibia-
des at the end of the Symposium tells us the
truth about Socrates, they claim, and that
truth paints a less than flattering picture of
Plato’s self-proclaimed master of erotics.
This paper will examine this accusation.
Rather than beginning with an analysis of
Alcibiades’ speech, however, or of the por-
trait it gives us of Socrates, I will take the
more indirect route of investigating the
speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon. As I will
argue, what they say about eros sheds an in-
teresting light on the account of eros given
by Diotima and hence on the figure of Alcib-
iades as a beloved. We will thus begin by
looking at the speeches of Phaedrus and Ag-
athon, but will interpret both of them with
continued reference to Socrates and Alcibia-
des. Having analysed the views of eros ex-
pressed in these two speeches, we shall pro-
ceed to a brief comparison with the view of
the relation between lover and beloved that
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emerges from the speech of Diotima. Final-
ly, we will take all of this as a background
against which to evaluate Alcibiades’ accu-
sation that Socrates was never really in love
with him. 
The setting: lovers and beloved
The Symposium is, in contrast to other Pla-
tonic dialogues, hardly a dialogue. It consists
of six or, if we count Alcibiades’ “praise” of
Socrates among the love speeches, seven dis-
tinct speeches on eros, bound into a whole by
the fact that the speeches, and the nightly
feast at which they were delivered, is recalled
and recounted by Apollodorus who in turn
has his information from a certain Aristode-
mus. Both Apollodorus and Aristodemus are
followers – or, better – lovers of Socrates. Ac-
cordingly, the entire Symposium could be re-
garded as a single speech on eros, on love,
namely the love of Socrates. The Symposium
is, like its companion piece the Phaedo, a
work of disciples, recalling the words of the
master. And, as a lover of Socrates, Apollo-
dorus, the first speaker of the Symposium,
mirrors the last speaker, Alcibiades. Both the
beginning and the end of this work on love
place Socrates firmly at the centre of the dis-
cussion of the nature of eros.2 
The speeches on eros, which make up the
bulk of the Symposium, present us with dif-
ferent perspectives on the phenomenon of
love, perspectives that seem determined by
each speaker’s relation to eros. The basic re-
lation of love in accordance with which the
notion of eros is analysed in the Symposium,
is the paiderastic relation between lover and
beloved, erastês and erômenos, an asym-
metrical relation through which the beloved
is supposedly meant to become virtuous
whereas the lover obtains sexual gratifica-
tion. Hence the dialogue invites us to reflect
on the status of the different speakers. Are
they lovers, beloved, both, or neither lovers
nor beloved? Agathon and Pausanias are the
participants easiest to identify in this regard.
When Agathon was younger, Pausanias
was, without a doubt, Agathon’s lover, and
Agathon was Pausanias’ beloved; the way
the two are depicted in the Symposium sug-
gests that they are still related to each other
as lover and beloved.3 It also seems safe to
say that Phaedrus and Eryximachus are por-
trayed, and portray themselves, as a love-
couple, with Phaedrus playing the role of
the beloved, Eryximachus the role of the
lover.4 We thus have, tentatively, two lovers,
Pausanias and Eryximachus, and two belov-
ed, Phaedrus and Agathon. But when we
come to Aristophanes and Socrates, matters
are more complicated. Aristophanes has no
erotic relation to any of the other symposi-
asts, but he has what could be called a pro-
fessional relation to both Agathon and Soc-
rates, in so far as both are objects of satire in
his comedies, Agathon because of his posi-
tion as effeminate beloved, Socrates because
of his unhealthy love of wisdom. Socrates
also has no direct erotic relation to any of
the invited guests at the dinner party, but he
has such a relation to its two uninvited
guests, Aristodemus, who loves Socrates (cf.
173b3–4) and Alcibiades, whose complicat-
ed relation to Socrates we will look at more
closely at the end of the paper.
In sum, there are two speeches on love de-
livered by lovers, two delivered by beloveds,
one delivered by a man who seems to be nei-
ther lover nor beloved, but rather one who
loves to make fun of lovers in his plays, and
finally a speech by a man who claims to be a
lover, but is in fact revealed as a beloved.
And then we must not forget the final
76 · jens kristian larsen
speech of Alcibiades, the supreme beloved
who was transformed into a lover, much
against his will, when he met Socrates.5 If
Platonic dialogues can rightfully be said to
investigate abstract matters by portraying
particular people who claim to have a spe-
cial understanding of the subject matter dis-
cussed in the dialogue, we see that the Sym-
posium is no exception. All the guests at Ag-
athon’s party have a special interest in the
nature of eros – as Socrates claims (177d6–
e3), none of the dinner guests will cast their
vote against Eryximachus’ proposal that
they should spend the evening praising eros.
Eros according to Phaedrus
But let us turn to the father of the logos
(177d5), Phaedrus. How does he perceive
eros? His speech is commonly taken to be
the least interesting, the one representing the
lowest level on the ladder of love, as it
were.6 Moreover, as a beloved who seems to
focus primarily on the benefits one may gain
from relations of love or rather, from having
a good lover, he has been seen as a repre-
sentative of technical reasoning, of the cal-
culating use of reason.7 Like his lover Eryx-
imachus, who is a proponent of the art of
medicine (iatrikê technê), he is, then, seen as
a spokesman for technical mastery rather
than for erotically inspired wisdom. All of
this may be true. But this does not mean that
Phaedrus has nothing interesting to say
about eros. 
Phaedrus’ speech falls into three parts, the
first giving a brief account of the nature of
eros – he is the eldest of the gods (178a7–
c2); the second focusing generally on the
good things that eros causes – he installs
shame and ambition in a manner conducive
to virtue (178c2–179b3); and the third ex-
plicating these benefits by enumerating
three examples of love relations (179b3–
180b8). 
Phaedrus begins his speech with a mytho-
logical account of the nature of eros. He is
among the oldest of the gods, or simply the
oldest, since he has no origin, no parents
(178a6–b1). This account may be said to
foreshadow Agathon’s later demand that
one has to define what one talks about be-
fore one praises its effects (195a1–3), a de-
mand Socrates repeats (199c3–5).8 Apart
from this feature, however, the first part of
Phaedrus’ speech is hardly noteworthy. If
anything, it illustrates that Phaedrus is, of
all the speakers, the one closest to the poet-
ical tradition.9 He, more than anyone, lends
voice to tradition, and it is probably no co-
incidence that he seeks to eulogize eros by
claiming that he is the oldest, age being the
quality bestowing honour according to tra-
dition.
Phaedrus’ dependence on tradition and
convention at first also seems to come to the
fore in the next section of his speech. The
blessings he enumerates as following from
eros are blessings recognized traditionally in
Greek poetry as crucial both for the flour-
ishing of the polis and for the unfolding of
human virtue – shame of performing base
actions and ambition for performing noble
deeds are praised by Hesiod, Homer and So-
phocles alike. What is interesting in Phaed-
rus’ claim that eros installs shame and ambi-
tion in us, however, is that he links this to
the way we appear in the eyes of our lover or
beloved. It is because lover as well as belov-
ed is afraid to appear in an unfavourable
light in the eyes of the other (178d5–e1) that
eros can be said to install a drive in human
beings for living a beautiful life. The empha-
sis on the way we appear to others, on our
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renown, may of course again seem tradi-
tional. Is this not the view of virtue attacked
in the second book of Plato’s Republic,
namely that virtuous action is only worth-
while performing when one's reputation de-
pends on it, when one is seen?10 But before
we condemn this element of Phaedrus’
speech as a mere repetition of tradition, two
things should be noted. First, Alcibiades lat-
er claims that Socrates is the only one before
whom he has ever felt shame (216b1–2).
Does this not indicate that Phaedrus pin-
points a central aspect of how we relate to
people we care about when he focuses on
shame, an aspect Plato acknowledges?11
The second thing to note is that Phaedrus
explicitly connects his notion of caring for
one’s reputation or renown with the paid-
erastic relation. This is interesting because
the way in which he does this shows us that
Phaedrus regards the relation as having an
educative effect on both lover and beloved:
inspired by love, both strive to become bet-
ter. This goes against the traditional under-
standing of the paiderastic relation, accord-
ing to which it is a one-way affair as regards
the acquisition of virtue. The lover was sup-
posed to possess virtue already, which he
should then be able to hand over to the be-
loved in exchange for sexual favours, a view
we will see clearly expressed in Pausanias’
speech (cf. 184c4–e4). Thus it was only the
erômenos who should become virtuous
through the erotic relation. According to
Phaedrus, however, both lover and beloved
are led to live beautifully by eros.
What he means by this is spelled out in
greater detail when he asserts that eros
makes the lover inspired (entheos) in rela-
tion to virtue, making him like those that
are by nature best (179a7–8). Here he focus-
es on the lover, a fact that is important. For
in focusing first and foremost on the lover,
Phaedrus makes it clear that he is not prima-
rily claiming that it is useful for a beloved to
have a virtuous lover, able to make the be-
loved virtuous as well – which one might be-
lieve, considering the general consent that
Phaedrus is only interested in the beloved’s
benefit, most notably his own. What he is
claiming here is rather that it is useful for a
lover to have a beloved, because that will
make the lover transcend his own limited
nature and strive towards what is by nature
best. This appears to foreshadow Diotima’s
teaching that man, driven by eros, will ulti-
mately assimilate himself to the divine. This
alone should make us hesitant to dismiss
Phaedrus’ speech as unimportant.12
However, as has been pointed out by
many commentators, the final section of
Phaedrus’ speech, with its three examples of
love relations, seems to show us that his no-
tion of eros is not entirely consistent. The
problem is as follows: whereas the first two
examples, Alcestis and Orpheus, may with
some right be said to illustrate – the first
positively, the second negatively – his point
that eros is the best guide to living (and dy-
ing) beautifully or honourably, the third ex-
ample, Achilles, does not seem to do so. The
gods bestowed special honour on Achilles,
who was willing to die for his lover Partro-
clus, Phaedrus asserts, precisely because
Achilles, being a beloved rather than a lover,
was not inspired by eros the way a lover is
(180b3–4). 
So apparently Phaedrus claims that godly
inspiration or eros is what makes men truly
virtuous, while he at the same time seems to
say that those who become virtuous without
godly inspiration are better. Is Phaedrus thus
claiming, after all, that the man who is not
in the grip of love, the non-lover, as he is
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called in the Phaedrus (cf. 227c7–8), is bet-
ter than the lover? Perhaps. Or perhaps he is
merely claiming that it is understandable
that a lover in a paiderastic relation, who is
by Greek convention older than his lover
and primarily interested in his physical
beauty, should be inspired to perform great
deeds, but that it is more impressive when
the beloved, the younger man, actually re-
turns the love and is willing to die for the
older lover also. If this is so, we can say that
Alcestis illustrates how a lover becomes vir-
tuous through eros, whereas Achilles illus-
trates that a beloved may, if not through
eros then at least through affection, agapê
(180b2), benefit from the relation, not by
receiving virtue from his lover, but through
being lifted up by his affection for his lover.
If so, Phaedrus really does conceive of eros
as a symmetrical relation, not because lover
and beloved mutually give each other what
the other lacks, but because eros itself
makes both strive to become better.
Eros according to Agathon
But enough about Phaedrus for now. Let us
turn to Agathon. What is his relation, as a
beloved, to Phaedrus? Apart from the some-
what dubious honour assigned to him by
most commentators of having as little philo-
sophical content in his speech as Phaedrus,
one might wonder if the two have much in
common. In fact Agathon explicitly rejects
Phaedrus’ understanding of eros, by claim-
ing that eros is the youngest, and not the old-
est, god (195a8). This is indeed important
for understanding the teaching his speech
contains, and I shall return to it in a mo-
ment. Nevertheless, there are a number of
striking parallels between Phaedrus and Ag-
athon, which I believe justify seeing the two
under one perspective. First of all, as noted
previously, both Phaedrus and Agathon, in
contrast to Pausanias and Eryximachus, be-
gin with a genealogical account of eros. The
birth of eros explains the nature of eros.
Phaedrus and Agathon also share, in con-
trast to their lovers, the assumption that eros
is one.13 At a deeper lever, this reflects that
neither of them seems particularly interested
in defending the paiderastic love-relation,
which may again be due to the fact that they
are beloveds. They experience love from the
object-side, so to say,14 they see what hap-
pens to people who become inspired by their
beauty, and they seem less interested in de-
fending their own erotic position in the man-
ner that for instance Pausanias and Eryxim-
achus do. Finally, and probably connected
herewith, both focus on eros as a force that
grips us and elevates us.
These features unite both accounts with
the teaching of Diotima. But let us take a
closer look at Agathon’s speech. We can di-
vide it as follows:15 the first part, by far the
largest, elaborates Agathon’s understanding
of the god. According to Agathon, eros is
the happiest or most blessed of the gods,
and he is so because of his beauty, on the
one hand, and because of the fact that he is
best, on the other (195a5–7). Agathon ac-
cordingly explicates the beauty of eros first
(195a7–196b3) and then goes on to explain
why eros is best, by ascribing to him the
four cardinal virtues: justice, moderation,
courage, and wisdom (196b4–196d6). In
the second part of his speech (196d7–
197c3), Agathon then elaborates the bene-
fits we receive from this god of youth and
beauty by focusing on the effect the wisdom
of eros has on those who are touched by the
god. In a final part, he reaches the summit of
his encomium of eros in a poetic tour de
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force, perhaps devoid of philosophical con-
tent, but nevertheless a beautiful peace of
rhetorical poetry (197c3–197e5).
Instead of following the structure of Aga-
thon’s speech, I will begin by looking at the
effects Agathon claims eros has, that is, on
the second part. He ascribes the main effect
eros has on us to eros’ wisdom. Eros is, in a
word, the greatest, and hence wisest, poet
since he makes all that are touched by him
poets, handing over his own poetic wisdom
to those he comes into contact with. We here
see that Agathon’s initial joke, that he might
become wise if he could just get Socrates to
lie next to him (175c7–d2), in fact matches
his understanding of eros and wisdom. In
his view wisdom is handed over to us liter-
ally when we come into contact with the
wise.16 As also becomes clear, Agathon here
understands wisdom as poetry, and poetry
in a fairly wide sense, as production or hu-
man achievement, a way of looking at poet-
ry that Diotima will later repeat. Anybody
who achieves something out of the ordinary,
whether in poetry, the arts, archery, divina-
tion etc., is touched by eros (196e2–197b3).
Therefore Agathon can join Phaedrus in
claiming that eros is “the fairest and best
guide, whom every real man must follow”
(197e2–4). 
What about the first part of the speech,
the one that describes the nature of eros? If
we focus on the second section of this part
(196b4–196d6), the one that ascribes virtue
to eros, it seems clear that Agathon is not
primarily interested in giving an argumenta-
tive justification for his view of eros as the
possessor of all the virtues. Commentators
have therefore attacked this section in par-
ticular for being based on questionable in-
ferences. But is this a criticism Agathon
would himself have found damaging? What,
we may ask, does he attempt to accomplish
through his speech? In a recent article, Jörn
Müller has plausibly suggested that we
should understand Agathon’s speech literal-
ly as his entry in the contest that he initially
claims he and Socrates will have about wis-
dom (175e7–9). Agathon, in delivering his
encomium, wishes to illustrate that he is, in
fact, the wisest in matters of erotics. And
this he does by delivering a poetically mas-
terful praise of eros that claims that poetical
mastery is the effect of eros on human be-
ings. Following Müller, we may then regard
the poetical tour de force at the end of Aga-
thon’s speech as Agathon’s poetic proof that
what he says about eros is true – eros is what
makes us wise in poetry – as well as his way
of proving that he is touched by eros and
hence wise. In delivering his encomium, Ag-
athon thus praises the god as well as himself
(198a1–3, cf. also 196d7–e2).
Indeed, the vigorous applause his speech
receives from all the other symposiasts at
first seems to prove him right: not only has
he won the poetic contest of yesterday, be-
fore 30,000 Greeks. He might seem bound
to win the contest regarding wisdom before
the more refined audience present at his
own party (cf. 194b6–8) – except that Soc-
rates, if he joins in the applause, seems not
to do so in earnest. The critical examination
of Agathon that follows at the beginning of
Socrates’ speech shows that Socrates is far
from happy with what Agathon has claimed
about the nature of eros.
So perhaps we should take another look
at what Agathon claims about the nature of
eros, now including the first section of the
first part of his speech (195a7–196b3). As I
noted, according to Agathon eros is the
youngest god and as such, eros detests the
old. If Phaedrus is the defender of tradition,
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Agathon is the defender of renewal and of
the new. According to Agathon, eros, the
god of love, overcomes the old Olympian re-
gime of violence and installs love among
men and gods, and Agathon could thus be
seen as delivering, to follow Gerhard
Krüger, a glorifying account of an age that is
new, mild, and civilized.17 If this is correct,
one might say that Agathon sees eros as the
patron god of sophistry, of the new that
overthrows tradition. Whether this is some-
thing that Socrates will wish to endorse of
course depends on a larger question of how
Socrates relates to tradition and sophistry.
Space will not permit a full consideration of
this here,18 but we may at least focus on Ag-
athon’s identification of eros as the principle
or cause of poetic production. 
In stressing this aspect of eros Agathon
may at first seem to analyse eros in accord-
ance with the paiderastic tradition. Agathon
claims that all good things come to humans
and gods alike from eros (197b8–9), and to
Luc Brisson this indicates that he identifies
eros as a lover, an ideal version of Pausanias,
who bestows goods on those he loves.19
However, in fact Agathon identifies the
source of all goods as eros, since eros is love
of the beautiful, and all good things are due
to this love (197b3–9) and not as a lover
who claims to be able to impart virtue to
others. This shows that Agathon has at least
an ambiguous relation to the tradition of
paiderastia. For what he must mean to say is
that we do not really need human lovers to
obtain the good, since it is our love of the
beautiful that leads us to it. Rather than
identifying eros with an ideal lover, as Bris-
son would have it, Agathon seems to under-
stand eros on the one hand as love of the
beautiful, on the other as an image of him-
self, the beautiful beloved.20 Eros is a belov-
ed that bestows goods upon his lovers, and
this is an inversion of the traditional paid-
erastic relation. If this is correct, we may say
that Agathon, like Phaedrus, identifies eros
as a force that is able to make a human be-
ing good irrespective of how good his lovers
may be. Love is, as it were, a self-generating
force. We may wonder whether this view is
to Pausanias’ liking. More importantly,
however, we should ask whether it is to Soc-
rates’ liking.
It is easy to suppose that Socrates dislikes
all of it. Indeed, he suggests that there is
nothing true in Agathon’s, or indeed any
other speaker’s description of eros (198d3–
199b2). But this is clearly nothing more
than a rhetorical exaggeration, since Socra-
tes’ speech, which he claims to have heard
from the wise Diotima, in fact borrows
more than a little from the previous speak-
ers. Moreover, Socrates claims that Agathon
spoke beautifully (201c1), and if the beauti-
ful and the good are related, as Socrates will
go on to suggest, it is likely that Socrates
does, after all, see something good in Agath-
on’s speech. Could this be Agathon’s claim
that eros is a producer of virtue and wis-
dom? The answer will be yes and no. First of
all, we should note a problem with Agath-
on’s understanding of eros that sets him
apart from Phaedrus. For whereas Phaedrus
seems to regard the drive installed in us by
eros as a universal phenomenon – after all
he claims that “there is no one so bad that,
once the god Eros has entered him, he
would not be directed toward virtue”
(179a7–8) – this is emphatically denied by
Agathon. Eros is only able to affect what is
already delicate and harmonious, he cannot
transform what is old and harsh, according
to Agathon (195e5–7). Eros the beautiful
only touches the beautifully young, thereby
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giving them the good. Or less poetically:
possession of youthful beauty is the precon-
dition for the acquisition of the good. We
may hope for Pausanias’ sake that those
commentators who suspect that he is well
advanced in age are mistaken. 
Agathon thus seems to be claiming two
incompatible things. On the one hand he
says that love of beauty has the power to be-
stow virtue upon us, and this allies him with
Phaedrus. On the other hand he seems to as-
sume that being beautiful is what makes us
good and blessed, thereby denying that eros
has any real power, since it cannot make the
old and ugly better. It is this narcissistic
teaching of the young and beautiful Agath-
on that Socrates attacks most explicitly in
the elenchus he performs (199b8–201c9)
before he proceeds to recount what he
learned about eros from the wise Diotima. 
Socrates’ elenchus reveals a further prob-
lem with Agathon’s account of eros. For Ag-
athon claims that eros is the cause of wis-
dom and everything good, and further
claims that eros is our love of the beautiful,
while at the same time maintaining that eros
is what is beautiful. This means that eros is
both our desire for the beautiful and the ob-
ject of our desire, the latter explaining why
eros, in Agathon’s description, becomes a
mirror image of himself. Agathon’s main
problem is that he is not able to see what it
is we desire, when we desire the beautiful,
but seems to confuse the object of our desire
with the desire itself.
Whether the elenchus is free from ques-
tionable inferences may itself be doubted,
but at least Socrates gets Agathon to accept
the point that eros himself is not beautiful –
Eros is a desire for beauty, – nor good –
since our desire for what is beautiful is also
a desire for what is good. Eros is in fact the
desire to forever possess the good and the
beautiful that we, in contrast with the gods,
do not possess, or at least cannot possess in
the way they do. For the self-obsessed Aga-
thon, this is a needed lesson.
Diotima, Phaedrus and Agathon
Despite this critique of Agathon, however,
we still meet his view of eros as a driving
force again in the teaching Socrates goes on
to report as the teaching of Diotima, and we
also find the assumption that this force is
the best guide for achieving the good. When
I now turn to this teaching, I will not at-
tempt to give a detailed interpretation but I
will rather focus on some general aspects
that may be regarded as repetitions of, or
developments of, thoughts we find in the
speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon.
Diotima begins, much as Phaedrus and
Agathon have done, by explaining the na-
ture of eros through an account of his gene-
sis: he is the offspring of penia and poros,
poverty and resourcefulness (cf. 203b1–
204a7). As the child of poverty, eros does
not possess the beauty he desires (204c4–6).
But as a child of resourcefulness he is also a
great hunter, who always tries to get hold of
the beauty and the good he loves. Somewhat
curiously Diotima at this point (204b8–c3)
tells Socrates that his previous belief that
eros is beautiful is understandable, since he
has mistakenly identified eros with the be-
loved, with what eros is striving for (204c1).
But eros, she explains, is in fact the lover.
What is the point of this remark? 
It seems reasonable to infer that Socrates
is here delivering a criticism of Agathon,
concealed as the teaching of Diotima. He
has already made a point out of telling Aga-
thon that he previously held the same view
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of eros (cf. 201e3–5). And as argued above,
Agathon sees eros precisely as a beloved, as
an idealized version of himself. As I argued,
he thereby appears to confuse the object of
desire with desire itself, by claiming that the
object of desire (the beautiful eros) is desire
(namely eros). Agathon’s love thus seems to
be self-love. That there is a problem in this
understanding of eros is something Agathon
already knows, however, at least implicitly.
For he is not altogether blind to the fact that
human beings are in need of beauty, and
that it is the longing born out of this need
that leads us to the good. In fact he has said
so explicitly in his speech, as Socrates points
out (201a2–6, compare with 197b3–9).
This knowledge may be due to the fact that
Agathon can see the effect he has on others,
as a beautiful object of love.
If these speculations are justified, what
Socrates is telling Agathon, by relating his
own previous mistake, is that he should re-
verse his understanding of eros by stepping
outside of himself, so to speak. If he could
look at himself as a lover in love with the
beauty he possesses, and forget that he him-
self is the object of that desire, he would be
on his way towards the good. If he could
somehow see the beauty reflected in the eyes
of his beholder and fall in love with that
beauty as a beauty he did not himself posses,
he would in fact be on his way up Diotima’s
ladder of love. For that ladder is structured
around our encounter with, and desire for,
beauty, beginning with the love of physical
beauty.
I will not go into any detail about this
“ladder”, but merely make three short ob-
servations on how it is connected with the
speeches of Phaedrus and Agathon. In elab-
orating the different activities in which hu-
man beings engage in order to attain the
limited kind of immortality possible to
achieve for us mortals (206e7–8, 208b2–3)
Diotima mentions the products that result
from love of honour, philotimia, presuma-
bly as a first indication of what it means to
produce psychic, in contrast to physical, off-
spring (208c2–6). Diotima explains that al-
though love of honour may seem to be irra-
tional it is all the same a form of our love for
immortality, namely a love of eternal re-
nown. She then reiterates the exact same ex-
amples given earlier by Phaedrus (208d2–7)
and claims that we must understand the
deeds performed by Alcestis as well as by
Achilles as done out of a wish for “an im-
mortal remembering of their virtue, which
we now retain” (208d7–8). One could say
that the love of honour reveals itself, on
closer examination, as a desire to be praised
for one’s virtue, a point Aristotle will later
emphasize (EN 1095b22–30). 
Of course, this is not the final step in the
ascent to beauty, and in the end Diotima will
deny that one acquires real virtue through
such acts born of our love of honour – only
the contemplation of beauty, she claims, can
generate true virtue in us (212a2–5). Never-
theless she seems to regard philotimia as a
lower form of that desire which, when di-
rected at the highest, turns into philosophia,
love of wisdom (210d6). In this way, Phaed-
rus’ old-fashioned understanding of eros, as
related to one’s honour or renown, is partly
vindicated by Diotima. This, however, will
not be the last word on the complicated no-
tion of philotimia we find in the Symposium. 
Secondly, Phaedrus’ notion that eros is
connected with seeing and being seen is, at
least partly, reflected in Diotima’s final de-
scription of the way the lover, moving up to
the perfect revelation of beauty, relates to
his beloved. When the lover has learned that
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beauty of soul is more honourable than bod-
ily beauty (210b6–7) he has to seek, Dioti-
ma claims, through speeches and arguments
inspired by the beauty of his beloved, to
teach and educate him in order that he, too,
may come “to behold the beautiful in pur-
suits and laws, and to see that all this is akin
to itself, so that he may come to believe that
the beauty of the body is something trivial”
(210c3–6). We thus see something of the
symmetrical notion of love expounded by
Phaedrus at play here, although what Dioti-
ma says is much more complex than Phaed-
rus’ simple claim that the lover and beloved
alike will pursue virtue when either is
looked upon by the other. For what Diotima
suggests is that the lover will become preg-
nant with virtue through looking at his be-
loved, and that he will then be able, through
this effect of beauty, to produce speeches
that will turn the beloved, much as he him-
self has been turned, towards a higher beau-
ty than the beauty of the beloved that initi-
ated the process (cf. 209c2–7). Ideally, the
lover will, through his love, transform his
beloved into a lover also, a lover of the
beauty that transcends lover as well as be-
loved. 
This is, as emphasized by Luc Brisson,21 a
reversal of the traditional paiderastic ideal
of education. For in Diotima’s peculiar lan-
guage of birth and pregnancy, it is the lover
who, in meeting the beautiful, becomes
pregnant and gives birth to virtue (209c2–
3). Where traditional paiderastia suggests
that the lover gets the beauty, through sexu-
al gratification, whereas the beloved gets the
good, through education, Diotima suggests,
in Seth Benardete’s words, that “the lover
gets the good and the beloved keeps the
beautiful”.22 Diotima sees the beloved as a
stepping stone for the lover in becoming vir-
tuous, and seems to suggest that the lover’s
ability to help the beloved to become virtu-
ous is a by-product. All the same, Diotima’s
teaching is, as she herself points out, a de-
fence of a special type of paiderastic love
(see 211b5–6) since the lover, in gaining the
good, will seek to make his beloved partici-
pate in that good as well.
A final point that connects Socrates with
Agathon: If it is true that Agathon claims
that eros is like himself, a beautiful beloved,
Socrates counters by claiming that love is in
fact like Socrates himself, ugly and needy.23
Agathon is not love but the object of love,
and Socrates his lover. The two thus seem to
make a fine pair. That they should become
that pair is, according to Socrates, what Al-
cibiades, through his drunken speech, seeks
to prevent (cf. 222c7–e3). So let us now turn
to that speech, with a view to our initial
question whether Socrates was a bad lover.
Alcibiades
A detailed interpretation of Alcibiades’ en-
comium is here unnecessary. It will be suffi-
cient to make some observations on his de-
scription of the failed attempt to seduce Soc-
rates. What is clear about this self-revealing
description is that Alcibiades at first con-
ceived of his relation to Socrates in terms of
traditional paiderastia. Trusting in his own
youthful beauty, he hoped to secure the
good from Socrates in a manner that paral-
lels Agathon’s initial joke that he might be-
come wise by lying next to Socrates. By ly-
ing, not next to, but with Socrates, he hoped
to become educated, to become virtuous.
But this, as he soon learned, was not to hap-
pen. Socrates did not care for his beauty at
all, which to Alcibiades means that Socrates
is in fact indifferent to human beauty
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(216d6–e2). It would perhaps have been
better for Alcibiades if he had hooked up
with Pausanias. He would gladly have told
him that he could make him better while
giving him what Alcibiades really seemed to
want – sexual intercourse (cf. 219b3–d2) 
Apart from the question whether Socrates
was in fact defective in respect of human
beauty, let us ask what Alcibiades hoped to
learn from Socrates. Before he relates the se-
duction-story, he informs the other Sympo-
siasts that none of them have seen the inner
beauty of Socrates, but that he has. Socrates,
he claims, is like a satyr: he pretends to be
ignorant and wraps this appearance around
himself in order to conceal the inner virtue
of sophrosynê (216d3–7). But this is surely a
Platonic joke: What Alcibiades fails to see is
that the outer appearance is the same as the
inner beauty. Socrates’ ignorance is his mod-
eration. And Socrates tells him that (219a1–
4). So what could Alcibiades possibly hope
to learn from Socrates? Ignorance? Or mod-
eration? Then he would have to accept to be
refuted by Socrates and to learn to give up
his care for the political as long as he had
not cared first for himself. And this, Alcibi-
ades is frank enough to tell us, he could not
do (216a6–b5): his love for the honour
shown to him by the multitude has made it
impossible for him to listen to Socrates. In-
stead he runs away with his ears closed in
order to stop the tears from swelling up in
his eyes (215e1–3, 216a2–4). His philotim-
ia, it seems, stands in the way of philos-
ophia. No one said it was easy to climb up
Diotima’s ladder of love. And this, it seems,
is the deeper point of Alcibiades' failed at-
tempt to seduce Socrates. The true failure is
that Socrates could not seduce Alcibiades,
could not turn him into a lover of wisdom. 
So, to return to our initial question: was
Socrates a bad lover? First of all, the answer
to this question depends on what we under-
stand by being a bad lover. If one means that
Socrates was a bad lover because he did not
really fall in love with Alcibiades and did not
seek to educate him as his beloved, the an-
swer might be yes. But then Socrates would
be happy to be characterized as a bad lover,
since he would claim that no one is able to
pass on virtue to another in the way the ideal
of the traditional paiderastic relation envis-
ages. If, however, one means that Socrates
was a bad lover because he failed to turn his
relation with Alcibiades into the relation be-
tween lover and beloved described by Dioti-
ma, things become more complicated.
As mentioned above, Diotima claims that
the lover should become pregnant with virtue
through his love of the beloved, and should,
as a result, generate beautiful speeches about
virtue in order to educate his beloved
(209b5–c7, 210c1–6). Since part of the lad-
der of love depicted by Diotima consists in
learning that bodily as well as psychic beauty
is nothing compared to the beauty of ways of
living and of laws (epitêdeumata kai nomoi,
210c3–4), while they in turn are only steps
on the way to the vision of true beauty, it
seems fair to say that the ideal paiderastic re-
lation would be one where the lover, through
his love of the beloved, would transform the
beloved into a lover, not of himself, but of the
things higher than himself, first ways of life
and laws, then types of knowledge, then of
beauty itself (cf. 210c6–e1). Thereby his be-
loved would, in coming to love the beautiful,
become truly virtuous through the effect of
beauty. So the real question is whether Socra-
tes was able to transform Alcibiades into a
lover, not a lover of Socrates, the man, but a
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lover of that which Socrates is himself a lover,
virtue and beauty.
In fact, Alcibiades’ speech suggests that
Socrates did convert Alcibiades. Instead of
being the beloved, he was transformed into
a lover (cf. 217c7–8, 222b3–4). But it seems
that he became the lover of Socrates, rather
than of virtue. Apparently, Socrates’ seduc-
tion of Alcibiades through his beautiful
speeches, which Alcibiades likens to the mu-
sic made by Marsyas (215b8–d1), did not
reach the deepest level of Alcibiades’ soul.
Did he fail because he could not generate the
effect of the philosophical eros that he him-
self has heard Diotima describe? 
This is of course possible. Socrates would
then, it appears, be defective in the use of log-
os. His use of discourse, his mastery of dia-
lectic, would be flawed in so far as it lacked
the ability to lead, or seduce, souls properly,
an ability that Socrates himself praises as a
major aspect of the competence of using dia-
lectic in the Phaedrus (261a7–8, 271c10–
d2). On the other hand, Alcibiades’ self-re-
vealing account of his relation to Socrates
seems to suggest that it is he, rather than Soc-
rates, who is defective. Alcibiades claims that
he has been ‘stung’ by Socrates’ discourses
(218a2–5), presumably because these dis-
courses have made him realize that he should
give up his political ambition, in order to care
for his soul (216a4–6, cf. Apol. 29d7–e3). All
the same, he is not able to live the examined
life Socrates recommends precisely because
he is more in love with honour, with political
ambition, than with wisdom.
If this is the real reason why Socrates
could not turn Alcibiades into a true lover, a
lover of beauty and wisdom, the Sympoisum
gives us a rather ambiguous picture of the
love of honour. On the one hand, the speech
of Phaedrus, as well as the speech of Dioti-
ma, points out that love of honour can be a
motivational force that leads us towards vir-
tue. The wish to be honoured for virtue is it-
self honourable, since it makes us imitate
what is better than ourselves. On the other
hand, the comical appearance of the drunk-
en Alcibiades at the end of the banquet
shows us how dangerous love of honour is.
Agathon rightly pointed out that eros, as a
desire for beauty, is a force that moves us in
the direction of the good, but he misunder-
stood the object of that desire, so that his
love became self-love, a self-love that is per-
haps most notably expressed in his desire
for the applause his beautiful poetry re-
ceives. In a like manner, Alcibiades seems to
have understood that his own love of Socra-
tes is a motivational force that moves him
towards the good but all the same he misun-
derstands the object of this desire, first of all
because he believes that it is Socrates, rather
than philosophy, he should love, secondly
because what love he may have of wisdom is
not strong enough to overcome his love of
the applause from the Athenian public. Like
Agathon, he prefers to remain a beloved,
rather than to turn into a true lover. The
drunken, comical Alcibiades may thus also
be regarded as a figure of tragedy: His love
of honour is the tragic flaw that prevents
him from becoming what Socrates had
hoped he could be. 
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